The OODA Loop

 

OODA Loop – the Short Form

One of the ideas central to Col. John Boyd’s Maneuver Warfare is the OODA Loop.  OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act.  It is a loop because once one has completed the series (taken an action), one takes the results of that action, adds that information into the process, and begins again.  The speed with which this happens is the tempo.  Even though most military exercises push this process at as fast a rate as possible, the tempo can be fast or slow and the ability to control that tempo can be a great help to the commander. 

Col. Boyd flew about 20 combat missions in F-86s at the tail end of the Korean War and the OODA loop was a way to quantify and examine the instantaneous mental process he used to win his dogfights.   Because of his skill in air combat he became one of the first instructors at the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, where he designed the dogfight tactics curriculum.

One of the most telling stories about both Boyd and the effectiveness of the OODA loop is the genesis of his nickname "40-Second Boyd."  He had a standing bet that he could maneuver from a position with a hostile (challenger) on his tail, to where he was on the challenger’s tail in less than 40 seconds – or pay the challenger $40.  He never lost.  In fact, friends clam Boyd seldom took longer than 20 seconds to win the bet, but he liked to have a little leeway in case something went wrong. 

When one thinks about close air combat the OODA loop seems obvious.  The pilot must Observe the number and position of opponents, the type of aircraft they are flying, what maneuvers the aircraft is capable of performing, and a host of other information from how skillful the pilots are to whether they seem to favor one type of maneuver or another.   One then has to take that information and integrate it with one’s own skills, equipment, position, etc.; thus, Orienting oneself.  A Decision must then be made on what to do and that decision put into immediate Action.  In close air combat that process must then be repeated as quickly as possible. 

While the tempo will not always be so fast as in a dogfight, or so directly impact on one’s actual survival, the same OODA process is an effective tactic to deal with all kinds of situations from combat to running a corporation. 

In a situation on the ground, the observation segment of the loop will almost certainly expand beyond visual observations.  Observation is in reality the process where one integrates all types of intelligence into the decision/action process.  These information sources may include maps, discussions with locals, and feeds from both open and classified intelligence sources. 

The observation phase has to be integrated with an understanding of one’s present position and what is known as the “Commander’s Intent,” or the overall goal of the operation. Intelligence is useless if one does not know where one is and where one is going, or what goal is to be achieved.  In the air, in the heat of battle, knowing where one is in relation to the OPFOR is probably the primary key to decision making.  However, on the ground, I would argue that at most times, really understanding the commander’s intent is the primary basis for making decisions and taking actions to achieve that goal. 

 Once the observation and orientation phases are completed, one can make reasonable decisions about how to achieve the desired goal whether it is to take a particular hill or to deliver food to a UN facility.  Sometimes the decision is actually to do nothing for awhile – whether it is to slow the tempo of operations or other strategic reasons.    However, the prejudice in Maneuver Warfare, and in the OODA loop, is to make some kind of decision and to take action.  The most effective outcomes are those that are based upon reasonable decisions properly executed.

When the United States first went into Somalia, USMC Major General Charles E. Wilhelm was in charge of the operation.  While the overall aim of the mission was to provide food aid to the people there, Wilhelm saw that the violence in the area both prevented the accomplishment of the mission and threatened the safety of US troops.  His intent as the commanding officer was to protect his troops and facilitate aid to the people.  It was his observation that the threat was from small roving gangs and individual gunmen rather than an organized army-like opponent.  He decided on two actions.  One was to send out loudspeaker teams to convince the Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight.  The other was to send out teams of sharpshooters with orders to shoot anyone who shot at them.  Those actions were extremely effective.  Not one American life was lost during the rest of the US-led operation.  It was not until the UN took over command that we were treated to the spectacle of US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Kinshasa.                                       

For a brief biography of John Boyd focusing on his military career and Maneuver Warfare see:  http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles97/PROspinney.htm